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peninsula, the Kurile islands, &c.* Our free intercourse with these regions would benefit the Chinese and Coreans, as well as ourselves.
It might be thought irrelevant were I to descant further on the Anglo-Chinese policy†. In the remarks which I have made, I have been desirous of demonstrating that, in my humble opinion, the course hitherto adopted is not that which will secure a permanent peace, and a beneficial and friendly interchange of commercial resources, and of intellectual advantages.
To avoid, or at least to mitigate, the evil consequence attending a rupture between England and China, our continued occupation of Chusan seems to me the most desirable course. There are many fair and for- cible reasons which would justify this occupation, and which would en- able us to prove to the Chinese Government that it would be for their immediate and permanent interest and national safety, that we should remain in possession of Chusan. It is a trite remark on England, that what she gains by war she loses by diplomacy. If we abandon Chusan, the truth of the remark will be forcibly illustrated; should we quit the island in December, 1845, I have not the slightest doubt that it will be occupied by the French. This opinion is universal at Chusan, and at Ningpo, Shanghai, and Amoy, even among the Chinese themselves‡. It would be unnecessary to cite opinions on the subject. I may observe, however, that Lord Suirdale stated to me at Chusan, 7th August, 1844, that he was recently informed by two officers, of lieutenant's rank, be- longing to the French frigate "Alemène" (which has been at anchor for many months in Chusan harbour), that it was their intention to occupy Chusan on its evacuation by the English. Lord Suirdale en- quired on what plea such a step would be adopted; he was answered-- "the Chinese Government have granted an island to England; they must also grant one to France, and this is the only island on the coast worth our acceptance and colonization."|| The Rev. Father Dauni-
court, the French Roman Catholic priest at Chusan, admitted to me that the above intention was to be acted on.
It would be unnecessary to propound the question, would it be advantageous for England, or for China, that France had military possession of Chusan: I say military, because she has no trade on
ments at ruinously low rates, or whether they arise from the peculiar personal and domestic habits of the Chinese, or from both these causes combined, we still look forward to an increase of the woollen trade, as a probable result of our extended acquaintance and dealing with that portion of the Chinese population residing in the neighbourhood and northward of the island of Chusan.
* The Americans are now proceeding to the northward of 32°, and we have thus thrown the trade in the hands of our rivals on this coast.
+ Among our other errors, we did not even think of stipulating for a revision of our treaty after ten or fifteen years this was obtained by the Americans; we did not require immunity for our Christian servants and followers; for authority to erect places of Christian worship, or to form cemetries. These points were granted to the French and to the Americans, almost as soon as asked; and the Emperor has finally acceded to the wish of the French plenipotentiary, and granted perfect toler- ation for Christianity. Such thoughts never seem to have entered the mind of the British plenipotentiary.
On this important point I obtained much additional information, which I communicated to Her Majesty's Government on several occasions,
The same observation was made by Monsieur Lagréné, the French Minister to the Court of China,
CHUSAN.
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this coast, and is not likely ever to have any worth the occupation of an island like Chusan, for mere commercial
* purposes A brief remark on another point appears necessary. It has been supposed by some that the Chinese empire is on the eve of dissolution, and that any foreign aggression, or pressure from without, would cause a rebellion and anarchy throughout the whole country. China is a decaying nation is evident to those who attentively examine its present condition and past history. We see no new intellect, no improvement in anything: in the military art, or in nautical affairs, the skill of past ages is not exercised; and the people point with pride to monumental or triumphal arches (as at Ningpo), bronze castings, sculptures and carvings, which they are at present unable to execute. Although abounding in authors and literature, no work has been written on the Anglo-Chinese war-nothing in fact was composed or appeared from the numerous printing offices of China, but the lives of two or three generals who had committed suicide or were killed in action. Wealth, individual and national, is diminishing, and the influence of Government (at least of the executive Government) decaying. In these opinions, the Rev. Mr. Medhurst, Dr. Gutzlaff, Mr. Lay, Mr. Thom, and other Chinese scholars agree. But although the mass of the Chinese people are either stagnant or retrograding, there does not appear any ground for supposing that the complete and final overthrow of the Tartar Government would cause general disorder, plunder and anarchy, in China. It is impossible to examine the economy and police of a Chinese city and not perceive how care- fully life and property are preserved by their "watch and ward” system, and to admit that if left to themselves, and not obliged to flee in terror to save their lives from a foreign "barbarian," how fully adequate the Chinese themselves are to the maintenance of the muni- cipalities that exist in each city in China. The idea, therefore, that the Chinese empire is likely to fall, and to be destroyed, if England persevered in seeking a freer intercourse with the people, is, I think, untenable; that the Tartar authority might in time be shaken, or put aside, is not altogether improbable, but that would not affect the mass of the nation, except perhaps beneficially, by giving them an impetus and vivification which they have long required.
The French plenipotentiary has obtained from the Chinese Government authority for any of the French ships of war to enter, refit, and visit any port in China; I think there is also an understanding that a French merchant-vessel may enter any port in China for recruitment. It is specially provided that if China and England be at war, or France and England, the ports of China are at all times to be opened to French vessels as friendly ships.
One of the best-informed men in China corroborated fully my views that democracy and despotism are co-existent in China, although the whole executive Government at Pekin is cast in an iron mould,-one mode of doing anything,-one thought stereotyped. This makes the Chinese automatons: a Government man dare not move or think for himself, but must do as he is taught; so also his speech and behaviour. The study of ceremonial is the most important duty of life. Centralization is the leading principle of the Government. Anything like a military power in China would end in the destruction of the Government; lawless armed bands would spring up, and raise the military above the literary. The law is therefore the great weapon of Government, and the most powerful instrument of revenge, malice, and hatred in the people. Women, when they dislike their hus-
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